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Who Should We Blame? And Where Was WKHµ7RUWXUH-6QRZGHQ¶? 
When it comes to holding people to account for the atrocities detailed in the Senate Torture 
Report (STR), it is clear that those in the interrogation room carrying out the torture should 
face a significant amount of blame for the harm caused.1 What is less clear, however, is how 
far up the chain of command the blame should stretch. Who knew; should they have known; 
and what role did they have in instigating or perpetuating the harm? 
 Upon reading the STR it can be strongly argued that while those at CIA Headquarters 
might have been distanced from the harmful acts, they were not only aware of the type of 
interrogation techniques used but also actively fostered and escalated a torture culture itself.2 
Indeed, the STR details how senior CIA officials created an environment for the successful 
deployment of torture by isolating themselves and their activities from external oversight;3 
encouraged an elite, inward looking mentality that distorted the pressures involved that 
resulted in the normalising, vindicating and even lionising of the abuse carried out;4 
developed a training program on how to administer enhanced interrogation;5 and smothered 
internal criticism from on-site interrogators who claimed that individuals ZHUH µcompliant 
DQGFRRSHUDWLYH¶but were still ordered by CIA Headquarters µto continue using the CIA's 
enhanced interrogation techniques¶± escalating and protracting the abuse.6 
In comparison, the role of the political elite is less clear. On the one hand it could be 
argued that they had no knowledge of the harm being caused and so cannot be blamed as a 
result. For example, CIA records state that prior to the use of the enhanced interrogation 
techniques on Abu Zubaydah in 2002, µthe CIA did not brief Secretary of State Colin Powell 
or Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld¶.7 Also, anticipating that presidential approval 
might be needed for the enhanced interrogation techniques the CIA significantly revised their 
presentation to reduce the harm reported and µeliminate references to the waterboard¶.8  
At this stage it could be that there was limited awareness by the political branches as 
to what was occurring and so their blame is muted. A simple lack of knowledge, however, is 
not sufficient. Those in positions of power should be held personally liable when they fail in 
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their responsibility to have all the relevant information they would need to make a full and 
rational decision.9 Those in a position of authority or responsibility are bound with the 
obligation to be informed on the actions of those within their care or jurisdiction. Such 
members of the executive and legislature are not laypeople, but individuals who actively 
sought a job with a position of authority and are thus charged with an extra-special 
expectation to collect information and act. Moreover, while it could be argued that they were 
never explicitly asked for authorisation, or the details were obfuscated, there were indications 
of abuse that should have prompted an explicit and personal review. For example in 
September 2002 when Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Bob Graham 
made multiple and specific requests for additional information and the CIA officials simply 
did not respond,10 given that he had concerns means he is still obligated to investigate further, 
report his concerns upwards to his superiors and pass them on to his successor, without which 
a significant degree of blame is placed on him for the harm that then followed.  
Equally, when DCI Tenet and CIA General Counsel Muller met with Vice President 
Cheney and National Security Advisor Rice on July 29 2003 to seek policy reaffirmation, 
even if they were not aware of the magnitude of the abuse, they were presented with a list of 
enhanced interrogation techniques including the use of waterboarding demonstrating that they 
were now aware that something far greater than is normally allowed was occurring. They are, 
therefore, at this stage guilty for the harm caused by not investigating further, informing their 
superiors and for giving their authorisation.11 Although the report indicates that Rice had 
originally advised against informing other members of the National Security council, she 
subsequently decided that Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defence Donald 
Rumsfeld should be briefed, which happened for the first time in a 25-minute briefing on 16 
September 2003.12 This widens the circle of blame rather than diminishing its individual 
power. Moreover, they are also negligent in their failure to inform the president as their 
superior. In doing so they also make the president negligent for not inquiring further, which 
becomes especially problematic on the behalf of G. W. Bush given the International 
Committee of the ReG &URVV¶V WZR UHSRUWV RQ  1RYHPEHU  DQG  $SULO  WKDW
raised concerns over the treatment of individuals that µDPRXQWHG WR torture and/or cruel, 
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inhuman or degrading treatment¶ and the media attention it received over the years.13 Any 
report of such horrendous treatment should have propelled those at the highest level to 
investigate, and failing to do so makes them blameworthy. 
What this amounts to is that all individuals at all levels of this tragedy are guilty of 
not acting; of not blowing the whistle. Torture represents one of the most egregious attacks 
on the individual, destroying them on a physical, psychological and emotional level. All those 
involved had failed in their universal duty to µGR D 6QRZGHQ¶ DQG EORZ the whistle. Even 
though the legality of whistleblowing is often contested and unclear, the moral argument in 
this instance is not. Regardless of what was seen as the benefit ± for which there was none14 ± 
all those who knew had a moral obligation to act to their fullest capacity to stop the harm and 
inform the public as the most likely avenue for achieving this. This failure leaves them all 
equally blameworthy for the abuse caused and as such should be tried for their criminal 
activities.  
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